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Abstract: Considering the mounting criticisms concerning Chinese aid practices, the present paper 
investigates whether Chinese aid projects fuel local-level corruption in Africa. To this end, we 
geographically match a new geo-referenced dataset on the subnational allocation of Chinese development 
finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 98,449 respondents from four Afrobarometer 
survey waves across 29 African countries. By comparing the corruption experiences of individuals who live 
near a site where a Chinese project is being implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals 
living close to a site where a Chinese project will be initiated but where implementation had not yet started 
at the time of the interview, we control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence 
the selection of project sites. The empirical results consistently indicate more widespread local corruption 
around active Chinese project sites. The effect, which lingers after the project implementation period, is 
seemingly not driven by an increase in economic activity, but rather seems to signify that the Chinese 
presence impacts local institutions. Moreover, China stands out from the World Bank and Western bilateral 
donors in this respect. In particular, whereas the results indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local 
corruption but have no observable impact on local economic activity, they suggest that World Bank aid 
projects stimulate local economic activity without fuelling local corruption.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen a changing aid landscape with a sharp increase in development finance 
from non-Western donors, both in absolute terms and as a share of global foreign assistance (see 
e.g. Strange et al., 2015; Dreher et al., 2015a). Largest among the ‘new’ donors is China, and 
with the explosion of Chinese funds, concerns over its donor practices has followed. Critics claim 
that Beijing uses their development finance to create alliances with the leaders of developing 
countries, to secure commercial advantages for their domestic firms, and to prop up corrupt and 
undemocratic regimes in order to gain access to their natural resource endowments (see the 
discussion in e.g. Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Penhelt, 2007; Marantidou and 
Glosserman, 2015). Others praise China for its responsiveness to recipient needs and its ability to 
get things done in a timely manner without placing an extensive administrative burden on 
strained public bureaucracies in the developing world (see the discussion in e.g. Bräutigam, 2009; 
Dreher et al., 2015).  
 Until very recently, however, there has been a lack of systematic empirical evidence on the 
effects of, and principles guiding, Chinese development assistance. Unlike the OECD-DAC 
donors, the Chinese government does not release detailed, project-level financial information 
about its foreign aid activities (Strange et al., 2013). This lack of transparency has made 
evaluation of Chinese aid notoriously difficult, and as a result, China’s aid to Africa is the subject 
of much speculation. However, a new comprehensive data material (Strange et al., 2015) now 
allows for systematic quantitative analysis of Chinese aid flows. 
 In the present paper we aim to investigate whether Chinese development finance has an 
effect on local-level corruption in Africa. More specifically, we ask 1) whether the 
implementation of Chinese development projects gives an increase in corrupt activity around the 
project sites, 2) whether Chinese development projects differ from the projects of major Western 
donors in this respect, and if so, 3) whether this difference can be explained by China standing 
out in terms of sector allocation of development projects or whether it remains when considering 
the corruption effects of a more narrow selection of comparable Chinese and Western 
development projects. 
 To this end, we geographically match a new georeferenced dataset on the subnational 
allocation of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 
98,449 respondents from four Afrobarometer survey waves across 29 African countries. By 
comparing the corruption experiences of individuals who live near a site where a Chinese project 
is being implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals living near a site where a 
Chinese project will appear in the future we get a difference-in-difference type of estimate that 
controls for unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence the selection of project 
sites.  
 The empirical results consistently indicate more widespread local corruption around active, 
as compared to not yet opened, Chinese project sites. The effect, which lingers after the project 
implementation period, is seemingly not driven by an increase in economic activity, but rather 
seems to signify that the Chinese presence impacts local institutions. Replicating our analysis for 
World Bank projects and other bilateral donors, we observe no equivalent pattern. Comparing 
China and the World Bank, whose aid projects, if anything, appear to reduce local corruption, the 
difference is particularly striking. Moreover, it is seemingly not driven by differences in the 
sector allocation of aid, nor by Chinese aid fueling economic activity to a greater extent than 
World Bank aid. Indeed, using satellite data on night time light to proxy for local economic 
activity, the results suggest that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption but not economic 
activity, while they indicate the reverse – i.e. that projects stimulate local economic activity but 
do not contribute to local corruption – for World Bank aid. Considering criticisms concerning 
China’s aid practices and the World Bank’s explicit anti-corruption policies, this is interesting.  
 Our paper relates to the literature on foreign aid and the quality of government, which 
provides mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and corruption (see e.g. 
Svensson, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Tavares, 2003; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Djankov 
et al., 2008; Okada and Samreth; 2012). A reason for the inconclusive results could be the 
tendency to study the relationship between aid and corruption at the country level. Considering 
the multitude of factors that could affect country level corruption, being interested in identifying 
possible corruption effects of receiving foreign assistance, a sensible approach is arguably to 
investigate sub-national variation in aid disbursements and corruption over time. Aid is not 
distributed evenly across regions within countries, and while it may have clear effects on 
corruption in targeted regions, this effect may be obscured by omitted variable bias or may not be 
sufficiently large to be measurable at the country level. The present paper differs from the above 
studies in that it studies the local corruption effects of a multitude of aid projects in a large multi-
country sample. As such, focus is on the effects on citizen experiences with petty corruption 
around aid project sites rather than estimates of national aid inflows and corruption in 
government. 
 While studies of aid effectiveness – including those on the relationship between aid and 
corruption – have traditionally focused on cross-national data, with this paper, we thus contribute 
to an emerging literature using subnational geocoded aid data to examine the determinants and 
impacts of the allocation of foreign aid within countries. A number of recent studies investigate 
the local allocation of aid within a single recipient country (see Francken et al. 2012 on relief aid 
allocation in Madagascar, Nunnenkamp et al. 2012 on the distribution of World Bank aid in 
India, Dionne et al. 2013 on aid allocation in Malawi, and Briggs, 2014 and Jablonski, 2014, both 
on political capture of aid in Kenya). Others consider subnational aid allocation in a selection of 
countries (see e.g. Findley et al. 2011 on aid and conflict, Powell and Findley 2012 on donor 
coordination, Öhler and Nunnenkamp 2014 on factors determining the allocation of World Bank 
and African Development Bank aid, and Dreher and  Lohmann 2015 on aid and growth at the 
regional level). Focusing on the subnational allocation of Chinese aid for a large number of 
recipient countries over a 13 year period, our paper is closest to that of Dreher et al. (2015b), who 
find that Chinese aid is disproportionately allocated to the birth regions of African leaders. 
 To our knowledge, this is the first paper using geocoded project level data to systematically 
investigate the local corruption effects of Chinese development finance in a wide selection of 
African recipient countries. As such, the paper also contributes to an emerging quantitative 
literature on the determinants and effects of China’s aid allocation, most notably consisting of the 
pioneering work of Axel Dreher and colleagues (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2015a; 
Dreher et al., 2015b). Considering China’s increased presence in Africa and the mounting 
criticism concerning Chinese aid practices, empirical evidence on the possible corruption effects 
of Chinese development finance is central. 
 
 2 Related literature and theoretical mechanisms 
 
In this section we will discuss related literature on the relationship between aid and corruption, 
most of which focus on country level measures of aid inflows and high level corruption. Next, we 
will give an account of some commonly suggested features of Chinese aid that could have 
implications for corruption. Finally, we will discuss theoretical arguments as to why aid could 
impact local corruption and how these relate to the aforementioned features of Chinese aid. 
 
 2.1 Related literature on aid and corruption 
 
Most literature on the relationship between corruption, which we think of as the misuse of public 
office for private gain, (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) and aid focuses on the relationship between 
country level aid inflows and corruption in the recipient country government. On the one hand, it 
is suggested that through the infusion of resources and technical assistance aid can potentially 
boost government effectiveness, for instance in terms of controlling corruption (see the reasoning 
in Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). It can release governments from binding revenue constraints, 
thereby enabling them to strengthen domestic institutions and pay higher salaries to civil 
servants, and it can provide training and technical assistance to build important government 
functions and institutions such as legal systems and accounting offices. Furthermore, aid can 
potentially be used to persuade states to embark on reform, for instance in terms of combating 
corruption (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2008).  
 Another argument, however, is that aid promotes rent-seeking behavior such as corruption. 
As described in Tavares (2003), where there are rents to be appropriated and where resources are 
transferred with substantial discretion and little accountability to the decision maker, there is a 
high risk for corruption. Foreign aid involves allocating goods or finance at below market prices, 
and hence provides opportunities for appropriating rents. Furthermore, recipient governments are 
often allowed considerable discretion in the distribution of funds. One can draw clear parallels to 
the ‘resource curse’ literature in this respect, linking natural resource rents to (among other 
things) greater corruption and weaker government accountability (see the discussion in Djankov 
et al., 2008; and in Morrison, 2012). Just as natural resource rents, foreign aid provides a windfall 
of resources to recipient countries, and may result in the same rent seeking behavior. Both 
sources of funds share the common feature that they can be appropriated by corrupt politicians 
without them having to resort to unpopular measures like taxation. And when revenues do not 
depend on the taxes raised from citizens and business, there is less incentive for accountability. 
Hence, large amounts of aid can potentially reduce the incentives for democratic accountability 
and thus the democratic pressures to combat corruption.
1
  
 The empirical evidence on the relationship between country level aid and corruption is 
mixed. While a number of studies suggest a positive relationship (see e.g. Svensson, 2000; 
Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008),
2
 
Tavares (2003), on the other hand, finds that receiving aid is associated with reduced corruption 
levels. And similarly, the results of Okada and Samreth (2012), suggest that foreign aid generally 
involves reduced corruption, but that this reduction varies by different donors. In particular, while 
multilateral aid is associated with reduced corruption levels, bilateral aid from the world’s 
leading donor countries, including France, the UK, and the US, has no significant effect. 
 A reason for the mixed results could be the tendency to study the relationship between aid 
and corruption at the country level. Comparing corruption across countries it is of course difficult 
(if at all possible) to separate the impact of aid from the effects of problems – consider e.g. 
colonialism, economic crises, unsustainable debt, civil wars and political instability – that are 
common in aid receiving countries (see the discussion in Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). To assess 
the effects of aid on corruption we need to consider changes in aid and corruption over time. 
However, while available country level corruption measures tend to capture large cross-country 
differences relatively well, it is questionable whether they are sufficiently refined to pinpoint 
accurately the short-term changes in corruption within a country over time (Alesina and Weder, 
2002). With this in mind, and considering the multitude of factors that could affect country level 
corruption over time, it is arguably more appropriate to investigate sub-national variation in aid 
disbursements and corruption over different periods. Aid is not distributed evenly across regions 
within countries, and while it may have a clearly discernible effect in targeted regions, this effect 
may not be sufficiently large (or may be obscured by omitted variable bias) to be measurable at 
the country level (see the reasoning on aid and regional growth in Dreher and Lohmann, 2015). 
The present paper differs from the above studies in that it studies the local corruption effects of 
aid projects in a large multi-country sample. As such, focus is on the effects on citizen 
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 For an alternative view, highlighting the differences between aid and natural resource rents, mainly originating in 
the modalities of aid transfer, see Collier (2006).  
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 See also the seminal papers by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Olken (2006) which, while not focused on aid 
projects per se, demonstrate substantial problems with corruption in large public expenditure programmes in a 
developing country context.  
 
experiences with petty corruption around aid project sites rather than national aid inflows and 
estimates of grand corruption in government.  
 
 2.2 Chinese aid and corruption 
 
A number of features could make Chinese aid stand out in terms of corruption effects. First of all, 
China is well-known for its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient 
countries (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Bräutigam, 2009; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010; Dreher et al., 2015b).  
Indeed, the principle in clearly spelled out in official Chinese documents; in their 2014 White 
Paper on Foreign Aid, the Chinese government specify that “When providing foreign assistance, 
China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the 
internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently 
choosing their own paths and models of development” (State Council, 2014). Some Western 
observers consider this approach a convenient rationale for economic involvement in 
undemocratic and corrupt countries, and suggest that it makes Chinese aid particularly easy to 
exploit for politicians and that it runs against attempts by the global aid-community to promote 
better governance in Africa (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Penhelt, 
2007; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015). 
 Investigating sub-national variation in Chinese aid allocation, Dreher et al. (2015b) find that 
Chinese aid is disproportionately allocated to the birth regions of African leaders, supporting the 
idea that Chinese aid may be particularly easy to exploit for politicians who are engaged in 
patronage politics. However, channeling funds to their home regions should not necessarily be 
viewed as corruption, per se. As noted by the authors, China’s aid to Africa is often described as 
demand-driven, with the initiative for aid projects often coming from the recipient side. A 
request-based system for initiating aid projects should provide opportunities for political leaders 
to overtly promote a subnational distribution of funding that best serves their interests, without 
having to resort to outright embezzlement of funds (see also the discussion in Briggs, 2014). 
 Based on the empirical evidence, it is not clear that China favors corrupt regimes in their 
allocation of aid. Dreher and Fuchs (2015) find that China’s aid is, for the most part, independent 
of the recipients’ institutional characteristics, including control of corruption. Hence, while in line 
with the non-interference principle, their findings do not indicate that China’s aid is biased 
towards autocratic or corrupt regimes, as is often claimed by its critics. Furthermore, their results 
suggest that in this respect, China is no different from many other influential donors. Similarly, 
the results of Dreher et al. (2015a) provide no indication that more concessional (or ‘ODA-like’, 
see the definition in Section 3) Chinese flows to Africa are tied to domestic political institutions 
or corruption in recipient countries. On the other hand, though, their results suggest that less 
concessional Chinese flows are more likely to go to countries with higher levels of corruption. 
The latter could be due to China being better positioned than Western countries to transact with 
poorly governed countries because they rely on financial modalities, such as commodity-backed 
loans, that reduce the risks of financial misappropriation, or that since state-owned Chinese 
companies are heavily backed by the government, they can afford to be less risk averse than 
Western companies and thus invest in risky but strategically important countries (Tull, 2006; 
Penhelt, 2007; Dreher et al., 2015a). 
 Another feature of Chinese aid, with possible implications for corruption, is China’s 
tendency to maintain control over the projects it funds from the project initiation phase to the 
project completion phase, often using Chinese contractors for work performed in the recipient 
countries (see e.g. Bräutigam, 2009). While one could argue that this makes it easier to retain 
oversight, meaning that Chinese aid could actually be less susceptible to waste and abuse than aid 
from Western donors (Tan-Mullins, 2010), it has been suggested that Chinese firms operating 
abroad have laxer attitudes about corruption and use corrupt practices to win contracts away from 
more honest companies in recipient countries (Bräutigam, 2009). Indeed, in Transparency 
International’s most recent Bribe Payer’s Index (Transparency International, 2011), where more 
than 3,000 business executives worldwide were asked about their views on the extent to which 
companies from 28 of the world’s leading economies engage in bribery when doing business 
abroad, only Russia scored worse than China.
3 
While it is noted that China in 2011 passed a law 
that makes it a criminal offence for Chinese companies and nationals to bribe foreign government 
officials, they point to considerable challenges in terms of implementation, enforcement, and 
ensuring that the authorities treat the issue as a priority. Furthermore, a large share of Chinese 
development finance to Africa is given for government infrastructure investments, a sector that is 
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 The score for each country is based on the views of the business executives who had come into contact with 
companies from that country. For each of the 28 countries with which they have had a business relationship (for 
example as supplier, client, partner or competitor) the business executives were asked ‘how often do firms 
headquartered in that country engage in bribery in this country?’ (Transparency International, 2011). 
notorious for corruption and where the Chinese companies involved do not enjoy a good 
reputation (Bräutigam, 2009). Considering that Chinese development projects tend to be tied to 
the use of Chinese companies, they might thus stand out in terms of the use of corrupt practices 
during the implementation phase.  
 In the next section we will discuss theoretical mechanisms linking aid and local corruption 
and how accusations of China having lax attitudes towards corruption in recipient countries and 
using corrupt practices when implementing development projects relate to these.  
 
 2. 3 Aid and local corruption: Theoretical mechanisms 
 
There are two principal channels through which aid projects may impact local corruption in 
recipient countries. First, the potential effect could work via economic incentives, i.e. through the 
presence of donors affecting the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt activity. Second, aid 




With regard to the former, economic theories of corruption usually assume that the public 
official weighs the benefits of corrupt behavior against its costs and chooses to establish a corrupt 
relationship when the former outweighs the latter (see the reasoning in Glaeser & Saks, 2006). 
While the benefits of corruption have to do with the public official’s ability to extract resources 
for personal gain, its costs originate in the probability of, and the penalties from, being caught 
(see e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
There are several reasons why aid projects may impact the costs and benefits of local 
corruption. On the one hand, donor involvement in an area arguably increases local economic 
activity and thus the flow of resources that are up for grabs, i.e. the benefits of engaging in 
corrupt activity.  This would not only be due to the actual aid inflow, but also to the up- and 
downstream activities involved in the aid delivery process, including e.g. the supply of inputs to 
projects, establishing an infrastructure to deliver aid financed goods or services to the poor, or 
simply catering to the needs of donor personnel. 
On the other hand, if a donor is committed to fighting corruption, its very presence in an area 
could potentially increase the perceived costs of engaging in corruption. As described in Charron 
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 See the parallel reasoning of Sandholtz and Gray (2003), on the impact of international integration on corruption. 
(2011), the mid 1990s saw the beginning of an ‘anti-corruption movement’ among major 
international donors, and today, many donors indeed use a ‘zero tolerance for corruption’ to 
signal a tough stance toward corrupt practices in recipient countries (De Simone and Taxell, 
2014). Against this background, it seems reasonable to assume that the donor could call attention 
to a problem of corruption and thereby raise the perceived probability of being caught if engaging 
in corrupt activity. 
Which of these effects that dominates is an empirical question. However, if the donor in 
question does not devote resources to monitoring or controlling corruption in recipient countries, 
the former effect, suggesting that donor involvement could fuel local corruption, should arguably 
do so. As noted, China takes pride in its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
recipient countries, and given their ‘no-strings-attached’ approach to aid it is difficult to argue 
that they are committed to fighting corruption.  
A different argument is that aid projects may impact local corruption through norm 
transmission (see e.g. Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002). Above, we discussed the possibility that the 
very presence of a donor in an area could raise the perceived probability of being caught if 
engaging in corrupt activity and thus the costs of corruption. An alternative, and slightly more 
optimistic, argument is that by raising awareness of problems with corruption donors can 
influence social norms and thereby instigate actual institutional change. Donors may be able to 
establish standards of conduct that delegitimize and stigmatize corrupt practices, i.e. not only 
fight corruption by raising its cost but also by managing to establish that it is wrong (see the 
discussion in Sandholtz and Gray, 2003). The anti-corruption movement among international 
organizations, described above, has indeed brought substantial attention to the fight to curb 
corruption, and recipient governments have followed suit (Charron, 2011). Presumably, these 
mechanisms could work in a similar fashion at the local level where aid projects are being 
implemented.  
Unfortunately though, norm transmission might as well work in the other direction, 
legitimizing and fueling corruption. Here it is useful to distinguish between prescriptive and 
descriptive norms. Whereas the former tells an actor how it ought to behave, the latter merely 
describes some observable pattern of behavior among actors, e.g., ‘everyone is corrupt’ 
(Greenhill, 2010; Zhou et al., 2015). As described in Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) statements 
such as ‘I was corrupt but so was everybody else’ reveal that a corrupt environment can serve as 
a justification for one’s own corrupt behavior. By stigmatizing corrupt practices a donor might be 
able to influence prescriptive norms. Importantly, however, the donor’s own behavior vis-à-vis 
local actors during the implementation phase could potentially also affect descriptive norms. 
Hence, the presence of a donor itself engaging in corrupt practices could potentially change 
descriptive norms on corruption. 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that norms are easier to change for the worse than for 
the better. Fisman and Miguel (2007) study the effects of cultural norms on corruption by 
analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Their findings suggest 
strong effects of corruption norms – diplomats from high-corruption countries were found to 
accumulate significantly more unpaid parking violations – but also that violations increased with 
tenure in New York and that these increases were particularly large for diplomats from low-
corruption countries. The latter could be taken to suggest that negative social norms may be 
stickier than positive social norms, or put differently, that people are more likely to assimilate to 
more selfish norms than to more cooperative norms. This is in line with the reasoning and 
findings of Zhou et al.  (2015), who expose lab participants to a sequence of different subject 
pools when playing trust games and find that the impact of exposure to a more selfish 
environment lasted longer and influenced behaviors to a greater extent than exposure to a more 
cooperative environment. In light of these findings, there is seemingly a risk that China, having 
been accused of engaging in corruption in recipient countries, fuel local corruption by affecting 
descriptive corruption norms for the worse.  
Summing up, we suggest two principal channels through which aid projects may impact 
local corruption in recipient countries – through the presence of donors affecting the costs and 
benefits of engaging in corrupt activity and by means of norm transmission leading to 
institutional change. Given China’s alleged lax attitudes towards corruption and suggested use of 
corrupt practices when implementing development projects, both economic incentive- and 
normative arguments speak in favor of Chinese aid projects fueling local corruption. In particular, 
if donor presence in an area increases the benefits of corrupt activity, and China’s hands-off 
approach to aid delivery implies that this increase is not accompanied by intensified monitoring 
raising the costs of corruption, the net economic incentive effect on local corruption is likely to 
be positive. Similarly, while China’s non-interference policy implies that they are unlikely to 
affect prescriptive norms in a direction delegitimizing corruption, their alleged use of corrupt 
practices in recipient countries risk affecting descriptive norms in a way that legitimizes 
corruption. 
Against this background it is interesting to investigate the local corruption effects of Chinese 
development projects. In particular, do Chinese development projects fuel corrupt activity around 
the project sites? Do Chinese development projects differ from the projects of major Western 
donors in this respect? And if so, can this difference be explained by China standing out in terms 
of sector allocation of development projects or does it remain when considering the corruption 
effects of a more narrow selection of comparable Chinese and Western projects? In the next 
section we discuss how to approach these questions empirically. We then proceed to try to tease 
out the potential mechanisms as much as possible. 
 
 3 Data and empirical strategy 
 
To this end, we geographically match new spatial data on China’s official financial flows to 




 The data on Chinese aid projects is obtained from georeferenced project-level data of version 
1.1 of AidData’s Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset, introduced by Strange et al. (2015) 
and geocoded by Dreher et al. (2015b). Given that the Chinese government does not release 
official, project-level financial information about its foreign aid activities, this data is based on 
AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology. As described in great 
detail in Strange et al. (2013 and 2015), this is an open-source media based data collection 
technique, synthesizing and standardizing a large amount of information on Chinese development 
finance to African countries. Despite the short time since the release of the dataset, the country-
level data has already been used in a number of (forthcoming) publications (see e.g. Dreher et al., 
2015a; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Strange et al., 2015).  
 Dreher and colleagues (2015b) geocoded the data, assigning latitude and longitude co-
ordinates, providing standardized names of the geographic units of interest and information about 
the precision of the location identified (for details about the methodology used, see Strandow et 
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 Namely Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
al., 2011). While some development projects are implemented in a limited geographical area, 
such as a village or city, others are realized at more aggregate levels, such as a district or greater 
administrative region.  Furthermore, many official finance projects listed in the dataset are 
intangible in the sense that they pertain to bilateral agreements and/or transactions between China 
and the recipient country that do not have a physical project site (Muchapondwa et al., 2014). 
Locations are recorded for each Chinese development project, but are coded into different 
categories depending on the degree of precision of the specified location (ranging from category 
1 for coordinates to an exact location to 8 when the location is estimated to be a seat of an 
administrative division or the national capital, see Strandow et al. 2011).  Since this paper focuses 
on local corruption effects of Chinese development projects, we are relatively restrictive in terms 
of which projects we include, focusing on projects with recorded locations coded as 
corresponding to an exact location or as ‘near’, in the ‘area’ of, or up to 25 km away from an 
exact location (precision categories 1 and 2 in Strandow et al. 2011).  
 For comparability with Western donors, we focus on Chinese aid projects that can be 
classified as overseas development assistance (ODA) according to the OECD-DAC definition. In 
order to qualify as ODA, an aid flow must be provided by official agencies to developing 
countries on the DAC list of ODA recipients. Moreover, it should be concessional in character, 
with a grant element of at least 25 percent, and its main objective should be the promotion of 
economic development of developing countries. Transactions which do not qualify as ODA, 
either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they have a grant 
element of less than 25 per cent, are labelled ‘other official flows’, or OOF (OECD-DAC 
glossary, 2016). Due to the lack of official reporting on Chinese foreign aid activities, the 
classification used here is based on coders’ defining a project as ‘ODA-like’ (as opposed to 
‘OOF-like’, or ‘vague official finance’ when there is insufficient information to classify the 
project as either OOF- or ODA-like, see Strange et al., 2015).
6
 Restricting our sample to include 
only ODA-like projects with precise geocodes and start-dates we cover 227 Chinese project sites. 
As can be seen in Table A1, the resulting sample of projects cover a wide range of sectors, the 
main ones being ‘Health’ (22%) and ‘Transport and Storage’ (19%).  
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 Our results are robust to also including the OOF-like and ‘vague official finance’ projects (the results are available 
upon request).  
 We use the point coordinates in the aid data to link aid projects to local survey respondents in 
the Afrobarometer. For geo-locating the Afrobarometer survey respondents, we draw on the 
efforts of Knutsen et al. (2016).
7
 As described in greater detail in their paper, the geographic 
locations of the survey respondents are specified based on various pieces of geographical 
information in the Afrobarometer. When provided (in South Africa and for a number of regions 
in Sierra Leone), the official enumeration area boundaries were used to place respondents within 
their respective enumeration areas (EA). However, for the majority of observations, each 
respondent was placed on the centroid coordinate of their reported town, village or neighborhood 
of residence using Google Maps. This turns out to be a surprisingly effective strategy for 
precisely locating individuals; evaluating the precision of the Google maps based coordinates by 
measuring the distance between estimated locations and true locations based on EA information 
from the 2001 South African census, the average distance from the EA, i.e. the geo-location 
error, is 13 km using the Google maps-based coordinates (Knutsen et al., 2016). 
 The aid data is linked to the Afrobarometer data based on spatial proximity. Specifically, the 
coordinates of the surveyed Afrobarometer clusters (consisting of one or several geographically 
close villages or a neighborhood in an urban area) are used to match individuals to aid project 
sites for which we have precise point coordinates. We measure the distance from the cluster 
center points to the aid project sites and identify the clusters located within a cut-off distance of at 
least one project site.  
 The map in Figure 1 shows the location of all our 8685 Afrobarometer clusters and our 227 
geocoded Chinese aid projects. While we have a good spread of both projects and survey data, 
some countries are not covered by the Afrobarometer. Furthermore, in some cases, aid projects 
are too far away from any survey cluster even if we have both types of information in the same 
country. Figure 2 shows a map including the aid projects along with 50 km buffer zones around 
each Afrobarometer cluster. The aid projects that do not intersect with the buffers are not 
included in the analyses. We note that 185 of the aid project locations are within 50 kilometers of 
at least one Afrobarometer cluster. Figure 3 shows the matched aid locations in green and the 
unmatched locations in red. 
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 See also Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) who used geo-referenced data from Wave 3 of the Afrobarometer when 
studying effects of the slave trade on trust levels in Africa, and Deconinck and Verpoorten (2013), who replicated the 
analysis of Nunn and Wantchekon using Wave 4 of the Afrobarometer survey.  
 Our main dependent variables focus on individual experiences with corruption in dealing 
with public officials. That is, the focus is on individuals’ direct experiences with petty corruption 
as opposed to their perceptions of corruption in government or among public officials. We 
employ two Afrobarometer questions on experiences with bribes. Respondents are asked if they, 
during the past year, have ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in 
order to’ a) ‘Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or 
arrest)’, b) ‘Get a document or a permit’.8 Based on these questions we construct two dummy 
variables indicating if the respondent has experienced the respective situations at least once 
during the past year. We also construct two corresponding ordinal variables ranging between 0 
and 3, capturing the response categories ‘Never’, ‘Once or twice’, ‘A few times’, and ‘Often’.  
 Our main explanatory variables focus on living near a Chinese project site – either a site 
where a project is being implemented at the time of the survey or a site where a project will be 
opened but where implementation had not yet been initiated at the time of the survey. We discuss 
these variables further in the estimation strategy below. 
                  
 3.1 Estimation strategy 
 
Our spatial-temporal estimation strategy resembles that used in and Knutsen et al. (2016).
9
 In 
particular, we distinguish between sites where an aid project is actually under implementation 
and sites where the project had yet to be implemented at the time of the survey. Assuming that 
corruption is affected within a cut-off distance, our main identification strategy includes three 
groups of individuals, namely those 1) within 50 km of at least one active Chinese project site, 2) 
within 50 km of a Chinese project site that is yet to open, but not close to any active projects, and 
3) more than 50 km from any Chinese project site. Our baseline regression is: 
 
ivtitsivt inactiveactiveY   X21)1(  
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 As discussed in Isaksson (2015), the perception of what constitutes a bribe is likely to vary across cultures. In some 
developing countries, it has for instance been suggested that gift-exchange is customary in business transactions 
(Bardhan, 1997). However, the survey question asks about situations where the individual was required to offer the 
public official something in order to get the service, that is, before it was provided rather than as a courtesy 
afterwards. Moreover, country fixed effects control for country variation in the average level of corruption and focus 
is on within-country variation in the same. 
9
 See also Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016). 
 where the corruption outcome Y for an individual i in cluster v at year t is regressed – in the 
benchmark setup using easy-to-interpret OLS and linear probability models
10
 – on a dummy 
variable active capturing whether the individual lives within 50 kilometers of an active Chinese 
development project, and a dummy inactive for living close to a site where a Chinese project is 
planned but not yet implemented at the time of the survey. To control for variation in average 
corruption levels across time and space, the regressions include spatial fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) – either 
29 country dummies or 444 sub-national region dummies – and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). To 
control for individual variation in experiences with corruption, we include a vector (𝐗𝑖) of 
individual-level controls from the Afrobarometer. Our baseline set of individual controls are age, 
age squared, gender, urban/rural residence.
11
 To account for correlated errors, the standard errors 
are clustered at the geographical clusters (EA, town or neighborhood).
12
 For variable 
descriptions, see Table A2.  
   Interpreting the coefficient on active (𝛽1) in isolation as capturing an effect of Chinese 
development projects on local corruption would necessitate that the location of Chinese 
development projects is not correlated with pre-existing local corruption levels. This is a very 
strong assumption seeing that corruption levels (and other factors correlated with corruption, such 
as population density, economic activity and infrastructure access) are likely to influence Chinese 
project location decisions. For instance, the Chinese may well be less inclined to implement 
projects in highly corrupt areas. An alternative position is that the Chinese may be more likely to 
win tenders in particularly corrupt locations. In short, assuming that there is no correlation 
between Chinese project localization and the pre-existing institutional characteristics of project 
sites appears unreasonable. 
 However, including inactive allows us to compare active project sites to other areas selected 
as locations for Chinese projects, but where the project were yet to be initiated at the time of the 
survey. That is, we can compare areas before a project has been implemented with areas where a 
project is currently under implementation, and not only areas close to and far away from project 
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 Instead using probit does not change the interpretation of any results.  
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 The results are robust to altering this set of controls, e.g. leaving out the control variables entirely or adding 
potentially endogenous controls for education, employment and economic standing as seen in columns 3 and 4 of 
Appendix Table A8. 
12
 The results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the region (350 clusters) as well as at the country level 
(29 clusters) as seen in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A8.  
sites. For all regressions, we therefore provide test results for the difference between active and 
inactive (i.e. 𝛽1 − 𝛽2), giving us a difference-in-difference type of measure
13
 that controls for 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence selection into being a Chinese 
project site.  
 Being interested in whether Chinese development projects leave a footprint on local 
institutions, we need to make an assumption about the geographical reach of this mark. If Chinese 
development projects affect local corruption, individuals travelling to nearby market places and 
dealing with nearby local authorities are likely to experience the results. Individuals living 
sufficiently far from a project site, however, should not. As discussed in Knutsen et al. (2016), 
the appropriate cut-off distance from a project – within which an individual will be considered 
treated – is an empirical question, and a trade-off between noise and size of the treatment group. 
With a too small cut-off distance, we get a small sample of individuals linked to active and (in 
particular) inactive project sites. On the other hand, a too large cut-off distance would include too 
many untreated individuals into the treatment group, leading to attenuation bias. The choice of a 
50 km cut-off is admittedly agnostic, why we also present results using alternative cut-offs (25 
and 75 km).  
 
 4 Results 
 
 4.1 Main results: Chinese aid and local corruption 
 
The results consistently indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption. Tables 1 and 2 
present the results of our baseline regressions, focusing on experiences with corruption when 
dealing with the police (Table 1) and when applying for documents and permits (Table 2) during 
the past year. Our main regressions, which use a dummy dependent variable, focus on local 
corruption within 50 kilometers of project sites and include the baseline individual controls, year 
fixed effects and country or 444 sub-national region dummies, are presented in Columns 1 and 2.  
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 Comparing the difference between post-treatment individuals (with an active Chinese project within 50 km) and 
control individuals (with no Chinese project – active or inactive – within 50 km) with the difference between pre-
treatment individuals (with a yet inactive Chinese project within 50 km) and control individuals within the same 
country/region and year (due to country/region and year fixed effects). 
 Looking at the coefficients on active, we can note that living within 50 kilometers of sites 
where Chinese projects are currently being implemented is, indeed, associated with a greater 
probability of having experienced corruption. In particular, compared to individuals in the same 
country who do not live close to any Chinese project site, respondents with an active project site 
in their vicinity are approximately 2.5 percentage points more likely to have paid a bribe when 
dealing with the police (Table 1, Column 1). Controlling for sub-national regional variation (at 
the expense of losing some observations due to collinearity) this parameter becomes larger; 
compared to people in the same province/region who do not live close to any Chinese project site, 
respondents with an active project site nearby are approximately 5 percentage points more likely 
to have paid a bribe. Considering having to pay bribes in order to get documents and permits 
instead (Table 2), the results follow the same pattern. 
 As noted, however, interpreting the coefficient on active in isolation as capturing an effect of 
Chinese development projects on local corruption requires that the location of Chinese 
development projects is not correlated with pre-existing local corruption levels, an assumption 
which we do not deem plausible. In order to account for the likely endogenous placement of 
projects we use a difference-in-difference approach, comparing experiences with corruption in 
areas close to sites where a Chinese project is currently being implemented (active) with those in 
areas close to sites where a Chinese project will take place but where implementation was yet to 
be initiated at the time of the survey (inactive). Looking at the coefficients on inactive, we can 
note that unlike in areas with active Chinese projects, we here see no clear divergent pattern in 
corruption experiences (for permit bribes the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level in the first estimation, but this result does not withstand the inclusion of sub-
national region fixed effects). Nevertheless, we should account for the strong possibility that sites 
selected for Chinese development projects differ from other areas in respects relevant for local 
corruption. 
 The difference-in-difference estimates (β1 − β2) and associated test results presented in the 
bottom rows of Tables 1 and 2 consistently indicate more widespread local corruption close to 
active compared to yet inactive Chinese project sites.
14
 In comparison with people in the same 
region/province living close to yet inactive Chinese project sites, individuals living near sites 
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 Again, the only exception is Column 1 of Table 2, where the larger point estimate for active is not statistically 
different from that for inactive. In all estimations controlling for regional variation, however, the parameter 
difference between the two is highly statistically significant.  
where Chinese projects are currently being implemented are 6 percentage points more likely to 
have paid a bribe when dealing with the police (Table 1, Column 2). For bribes when applying 
for documents and permits, the equivalent difference is 4 percentage points (Table 2, Column 2). 
In both cases, the parameter differences are highly statistically significant. In Figure 4 we show 
the level of bribes paid as a function of the year the respondent is surveyed in relation the start of 
a project, estimated separately and non-parametrically for treated (blue) and control (red) areas 
using locally weighted regression. The treated refer to those with a Chinese project within 50 
kilometers and the control to those with a Chinese project 50-200 kilometers away. We center the 
start year of the projects at zero, meaning that to the left of this point the treatment group captures 
respondents connected to inactive project sites and to the right it captures respondents connected 
to active project sites. We can note that before the projects start, both treatment and control areas 
follow similar trends but with more corruption in control areas. Importantly though, after the start 
of the projects we see corruption rising faster in treatment areas, and soon exceeding the 
corruption level in the control areas.  If anything, the increase in bribes seems to start somewhat 
earlier than the recorded project start. This may indicate that we measure the start date with some 
noise, or that the corrupt activity starts accelerating already in the projects’ planning phase. Such 
pre-start effects arguably imply that our estimated corruption effects should be seen as a lower 
bound for the total effects of Chinese aid projects on corruption. 
 Next, we test whether altering the cut-off distance from project sites changes our results, 
using a 25 km cut-off in Column 3 and a 75 km cut-off in Column 4. In both cases, the results 
still indicate more widespread corruption near active as compared to inactive Chinese project 
sites, the differences being highly statistically significant both for police and permit bribes. As 
might be expected, the differences between the two are seemingly larger when using a smaller 
cut-off, i.e. when considering the more immediate surrounding of the project site rather than a 
wider area, providing some indication that the observed corruption effects wear off with distance. 
We show this more clearly in Figure 5 where we plot the levels of corruption as a function of the 
distance to the closest aid project in kilometers. Each dot represents a local average so that there 
are equally many observations in each of the 20 dots of each color (red for areas close to active 
projects and blue for areas close to inactive projects). We can note that the closer we get to the 
project site, the greater is the corruption difference between active and inactive areas. We also see 
that the difference between active and inactive areas decrease with distance and that the lines 
eventually cross. This pattern holds for both types of bribes.                                                            
 In the benchmark setup we exclude respondents who live within the cut-off distance of a site 
where a Chinese project has been terminated prior to the interview date (approximately 28 
percent of respondents). The argument is that this may otherwise bias the effect of having an 
active project nearby, e.g. by inflating corruption levels among supposedly untreated individuals 
or by interfering with the effect of treated individuals living close to active or inactive sites. In 
Column 5, however, we instead keep these individuals in the regression, but include a dummy 
variable to control for having a terminated project within the cut-off distance. The statistically 
significant difference in corruption experiences between individuals living close to active and yet 
inactive Chinese project sites remain. Moreover, we can note that the dummy for having a 
terminated project nearby has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, both for police 
and permit bribes. For police bribes, this coefficient is significantly higher than that of inactive 
but significantly lower than that of active (the test results are available upon request), seemingly 
suggesting that the corruption effect of a Chinese project lingers after it has been terminated, but 
wears off somewhat after the implementation phase. For permit bribes, the coefficients on active, 
inactive and terminated display the same pattern, but here terminated is only statistically different 
(and only at the 10% level) from active. 
 In Column 6 we use the equivalent ordinal dependent variables described in Section 3. 
Compared to the dummies used as dependent in the benchmark setup, these variables have the 
advantage that they contain more information on the prevalence of corruption, but arguably do 
not come with an equally straightforward interpretation. In any case, the results remain 
unchanged. In particular, the statistically significant difference between active and inactive is 
0.103 for police bribes and 0.062 for permit bribes (see Column 6, Tables 1-2), which, put in 
relation to a sample mean of approximately 0.23 for both the ordinal dependent variables, is 
sizeable.  
 Table 3 shows the results of estimations using alternative bribe outcomes. In particular, the 
respondents are asked if they have had to pay a bribe: for school placement, to get medicine or 
medical attention, for water or sanitation services, or to cross a border.  While these variables are 
interesting we do not include them in the baseline specification as they are not included in all 
survey rounds. Nevertheless, we can note that for three out of the four variables, corruption is 
higher in areas close to active as compared to inactive project sites. For the fourth variable, 
border crossings, we only have 8,822 observations and in addition this type of corruption affects 
relatively few people (93 percent of the estimation sample respond ‘never’).  
 Furthermore, as we have data from many different countries we are able to explore some 
possible heterogeneities in our results. Using data from the Quality of Government (QoG) 
database (Teorell et.al., 2015) we test if the effects are similar in rich vs poor countries, more or 
less corrupt countries, and more or less democratic countries. The results are presented in 
Appendix Table A3. For police bribes there is an effect of Chinese aid in all sub-samples. For 
permit bribes the difference between active and inactive is statistically significant in the richer 
and less democratic sub-samples. However, while not always statistically significant at 
conventional levels, the difference goes in the expected direction in all sub-samples. 
 
 4.2 Exploring theoretical mechanisms 
 
Considering China’s alleged lax attitudes towards corruption and suggested use of corrupt 
practices when implementing development projects, we argued that both economic incentive- and 
normative arguments speak in favor of Chinese aid projects fueling local corruption. While the 
data does not allow us to clearly distinguish between these two channels we can explore 
suggestive evidence speaking for or against the respective mechanisms.   
 If the increase in corruption around aid project sites is primarily due to a surge in economic 
activity and thus in the flow of resources that are up for grabs, we would expect to observe an 
effect of Chinese aid projects on economic activity, and of economic activity on corruption. To 
proxy for local economic activity we use satellite data on nighttime light. Following Knutsen et 
al. (2016) we use data on median and average light within a 50 kilometer buffer around each 
Afrobarometer cluster. This measure has been shown to correlate with economic activity (e.g. 
Henderson et al., 2012), and is available for every square kilometer and year between 1992 and 
2010.  
 As the measure of nighttime light is at the cluster level we collapse the data accordingly. 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the baseline results are robust to this. Since the concerned data 
on nighttime light does not reach beyond 2010 the sample is further reduced. Column 2 shows 
that this has little impact on our results. In column 3 we test whether aid affects the median level 
of light in an area and find that there is no relationship on average. We further show that there is 
no relationship between paying a bribe and the median level of light in area (Column 4). 
Furthermore, controlling for the median level of light does not reduce the strength of our 
relationship between aid projects and bribes (Column 5) and there does not seem to any 
differential relationship between economic activity and corruption in active aid non-active aid 
areas (Column 6).
15
 Hence, it does not seem to be the case that it is merely increased economic 
activity that drives the relationship between Chinese aid and corruption.  
 We also check if the police bribe results are driven by more police officers or police stations 
in the area. This does not seem to be the case. When we investigate whether the survey 
enumerator has seen any police station or police in the survey cluster (Table A4) if anything, 
there are less police stations in the active aid areas than in the inactive aid areas. Furthermore, we 
run estimations using dummy variables capturing having no experience with applying for a 
documents or permit or to have been in contact with the police as dependent variables (see Table 
A5). Curiously, both estimations suggest that individuals living close to active Chinese project 
sites as compared to inactive project sites tend to have less experience of the concerned activities.  
That is, the results indicate that people living near active Chinese project sites are less involved 
with the police and with applying for documents and permits, but still experience more corruption 
in connection to these activities. An interpretation of this finding could be that the increase in 
corruption discourages people from applying for documents and permits and makes them avoid 
the police.  
 Our second suggested mechanism focused on norm transmission. We proposed that Chinese 
aid projects might fuel local corruption since China’s non-interference policy implies that they 
are unlikely to affect prescriptive norms in a direction delegitimizing corruption, and their alleged 
use of corrupt practices in recipient countries risk affecting descriptive norms in a way that 
legitimizes corruption. Ideally, we would want a measure capturing corruption norms, in order to 
investigate whether people in areas close to active Chinese project sites have become more 
accepting of corruption. The closest we get to this is a question focusing on whether the media 
should investigate and report on corruption, available in rounds 4 and 5 of the Afrobarometer. 
While not perfect, it could help shed light on to what extent that respondents take the issue 
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 We reach similar conclusions and the results are very similar if we instead use average luminosity instead of the 
median luminosity or if we use the continuous measure of corruption instead of a dummy.  
seriously. Column 1 of Table 5 presents results of estimations using a dummy variable for 
believing that media should investigate and report on corruption – as dependent variable (using 
the benchmark set of explanatory variables). We see a statistically significant difference between 
individuals living close to active and yet inactive project sites. According to this estimation, 
individuals living near active project sites are indeed less likely to report that media need to do 
so, possibly revealing more accepting attitudes towards corruption. Hence, unlike the empirical 
results on economic activity, which suggested no effect of Chinese aid projects, these estimations 
could be said to provide some, admittedly suggestive, evidence that Chinese aid projects affect 
norms in a way legitimizing corruption. 
 Summing up our results so far, they consistently indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local 
corruption. Moreover, the effect, which seemingly lingers after the project implementation 
period, does not appear to be driven simply by an increase in economic activity, but rather seems 
to imply that the Chinese presence impacts local institutions. Is Chinese aid different in this 
respect, or is Western aid no better? In section 2.3 we pointed to a number of features that could 
potentially make Chinese aid stand out in terms of its implications for local corruption. In the 
next section we compare China to a major Western donor, running equivalent estimations for 
World Bank aid projects for which there is also geo-referenced data available for a large multi-
country African sample. 
 
 4.3 Chinese and World Bank aid compared 
 
As it turns out, we do not find an equivalent pattern around World Bank project sites. Table 6 
presents the results of regressions for both police bribes (Columns 1-2) and permit bribes 
(Columns 3-4), including country dummies (Column 1 and 3) or region dummies (Columns 2 and 
4). Only in Column 4, focusing on permit bribes and controlling for regional variation, is the 
coefficient on active statistically significant. Importantly, however, in none of the estimations it is 
statistically different from the coefficient on inactive. Hence, we find no evidence of World Bank 
projects fueling local corruption. If anything, the weak indication of more permit bribes around 
project sites is seemingly driven by a selection effect – a tendency to locate World Bank projects 
in areas with more corruption to begin with – rather than being an effect of the World Bank 
presence.  
 Table 7 further shows, that in contrast to Chinese aid, World Bank projects seem to increase 
the level of economic activity in the areas as measured by nighttime light (column 3). Another 
difference is that we find no statistically significant difference in the active aid areas as compared 
to in the inactive aid areas with respect to either police presence or experience with police or 
permit situations for the World Bank aid (Tables A6 and A7). We also find that, contrary to the 
effects of Chinese aid, aid from the World Bank makes people more likely to think that media 
should investigate and report on corruption (column 2 of Table 5), thus providing suggestive 
evidence that the World Bank are successful in affecting social norms in a direction de-
legitimizing corruption 
 To what extent are the Chinese and World Bank projects comparable? Comparing all 
Chinese and World Bank African aid projects geocoded with the same reported level of 
precision
16
 we have, to some extent, already narrowed down our selection of projects. As noted in 
Dreher and Lohmann (2015), the geographical coding precision tends to reflect the sectoral 
composition of aid. While projects in sectors such as “Finance” or “Public Administration, Law, 
and Justice” are often geo-coded at the national scale, projects in sectors like “Transportation” are 
typically assigned to more precise locations. Hence, the mere fact that we focus on projects with 
equally precise geocodes should arguably make the selection of Chinese and World Bank projects 
more comparable.  
 However, important differences are likely to remain. For instance, a large share of Chinese 
development finance to Africa focuses on infrastructure investments, a sector that is notorious for 
corruption (Bräutigam, 2009). To investigate whether the sectoral composition of aid is what 
drives the corruption differences between the two donors, in a next step we compare Chinese and 
World Bank projects going to the same sectors, focusing on ‘Transport and storage’ and ‘Health’.  
 These are the sectors receiving the largest shares of the Chinese aid projects in our sample 
(19 and 22 percent respectively). Nevertheless, looking at projects to one sector alone still means 
that we have a limited number of active and inactive Chinese project sites to consider (42 for 
transport and 49 for health, to be precise) spread across a limited number of countries. The World 
Bank has a greater number of projects spread across Africa, but in order to get a comparable 
sample, we focus on recipient countries that have both Chinese and World Bank projects in the 
                                                          
16
 I.e. with recorded locations coded as corresponding to an exact location or as ‘near’, in the ‘area’ of, or up to 25 
km away from an exact location (precision categories 1 and 2 in Strandow et al. 2011). 
respective sectors (Columns 1 and 3 in Tables  8 and 9).
17
 In a more restrictive setup, we include 
only recipient countries where respondents can be linked to both active and inactive Chinese and 
World Bank transport projects (Columns 2 and 4 in Tables 8 and 9).
18
 
 Considering the transport sector (Table 8), the pattern observed for overall aid holds. In three 
out of the four estimations there is a statistically significant difference, in the expected direction, 
between the corruption experiences of individuals living near active and yet inactive Chinese 
transport project sites (Panel A). For World Bank transport projects (Panel B), on the other hand, 
none of the estimations suggest a statistically significant difference between the parameters of 
active and inactive (if anything, the results suggest reduced corruption around active project 
sites). Hence, the difference in corruption experiences around Chinese and World Bank project 
sites is seemingly not simply the result of a disproportionate share of Chinese aid going to a 
sector particularly prone to corruption. 
 Nevertheless, the extent to which Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption seems to vary 
across sectors. In the health sector (Table 9), there is no evidence that neither Chinese nor World 
Bank projects fuel local corruption. Interestingly, for World Bank health projects, when there is a 
difference between active and inactive (see Column 4), it in fact goes in the opposite direction, 
indicating more widespread corruption in areas around yet inactive project sites than in areas 
where projects are being implemented. If anything, the results thus suggest that World Bank 
health projects tend to be located in areas with higher pre-existing corruption, but help reduce 
corruption once they are being implemented.  
 
 4.4 Chinese and other bilateral aid compared 
 
Do the different corruption experiences observed around Chinese and World Bank project sites 
simply reflect differences in the impact of bilateral and multilateral aid? Indeed, a common 
argument is that bilateral aid is often tied to the political agenda of the donor country and that it is 
less focused on promoting good governance in the recipient country. In comparison, multilateral 
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 Namely, Benin, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria and Uganda for transport projects, and 
Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Uganda for health 
projects. 
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 Namely, Mali, Mozambique and Nigeria for transport projects, and Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar and Uganda for 
health projects.  
 
donors tend to have explicit anti-corruption policies as part of their agenda and are often seen as 
relatively more impartial. The World Bank, in particular, has been at the forefront of what has 
been labeled the ‘anti-corruption movement’, initiated among major international organizations in 
the mid-1990s (see the discussion in Charron, 2011). Our results so far – suggesting that bilateral 
Chinese aid fuel local corruption but finding no such evidence for the multilateral World Bank 
aid – could be said to be in line with this idea.  Furthermore, when considering the health sector 
alone, they provide some suggestive evidence in support of Okada and Samreth’s (2012) finding 
that multilateral aid is associated with reduced corruption levels at the country level. These 
authors, however, found no equivalent country level relationship between bilateral aid and 
corruption. 
 To investigate if the bilateral-multilateral distinction is what drives the observed differences 
among donors, in a next step we compare the suggested local corruption effects of Chinese aid 
projects to those of other bilateral donors, for which there is geocoded aid project data available 
for a small selection of African countries. For Nigeria and Uganda there is geocoded aid data for 
both China and other bilateral donors, thus allowing for comparison.
19
 Table 10 presents the 
results of estimations focusing on Chinese and other bilateral aid
20
 to Nigeria and Uganda.  
 Looking at Panel A, we can note that when considering Chinese aid to Nigeria and Uganda 
there is still a statistically significant difference, in the expected direction, between the 
experiences with paying bribes for permits of individuals living near active and yet inactive 
project sites. For police bribes the difference is not quite statistically significant.  Considering 
Chinese aid to Nigeria alone, the differences between active and inactive areas are statistically 
significant is sizeable, both for police bribes and permit bribes. Compared to individuals living 
close to Chinese project sites where the project implementation had yet to begin at the time of the 
survey, people living close to active Chinese project sites are 13 percentage points more likely to 
have been asked for a bribe when dealing with the police and 16 percentage points more likely to 
have been asked to do so in order to get a document or permit. In Uganda, however, we observe 
no statistically significant difference between areas near active and inactive project sites. 
                                                          
19
 In addition, there is geocoded aid data for the DRC and Somalia, for which there is no Afrobarometer data, and for 
Malawi and Senegal, which receive too few projects from China for us to be able to carry out any sensible 
comparative analysis. 
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 Including projects implemented by Austria, Belgium, France, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden, the UK and the US. 
 Performing the equivalent analysis for other bilateral aid to Nigeria and Uganda (Panel B) 
there is less evidence of aid projects fueling corruption. With the exception of a weakly 
statistically significant difference between people living near active and inactive project sites in 
the probability of having been asked for a bribe when applying for a document and permit (again, 
only statistically significant in Nigeria, where it is 8 percentage points, albeit not very precisely 
estimated), there is no evidence of individuals living near active and yet inactive project sites 
having different experiences with local corruption. Hence, even when comparing with other 
bilateral donors, who just as China might not have an equally explicit anti-corruption agenda as 
the World Bank, Chinese aid projects seemingly stand out in terms of their estimated effects on 
local corruption. 
 
 5 Conclusions 
 
Considering China’s increased presence in Africa and the mounting criticism concerning Chinese 
aid practices, the present paper aimed to investigate whether Chinese development finance fuels 
local-level corruption in Africa. The paper differs from most studies in the literature on foreign 
aid and corruption in that it investigates the local corruption effects of a multitude of aid projects 
in a large multi-country sample, focusing on the effects on people’s everyday experiences with 
corruption around aid project sites rather than estimates of national aid inflows and corruption in 
government. Aid is not distributed evenly across regions within countries, and while it may have 
clear effects on corruption in targeted regions, this effect may be obscured by omitted variable 
bias or may not be sufficiently large to be measurable at the country level.  
 We suggested two principal channels through which aid projects may impact local corruption 
in recipient countries – through the presence of donors affecting the costs and benefits of 
engaging in corrupt activity and by means of norm transmission leading to institutional change. 
Considering China’s alleged lax attitudes towards corruption and suggested use of corrupt 
practices when implementing development projects, we argued that both economic incentive- and 
normative arguments speak in favor of Chinese aid projects fueling local corruption. 
 To investigate the empirical validity of this claim, we geographically matched a new 
georeferenced dataset on the subnational allocation of Chinese development finance projects to 
Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 98,449 respondents from four Afrobarometer survey 
waves across 29 African countries. By comparing the corruption experiences of individuals who 
live near a site where a Chinese project is being implemented at the time of the interview to those 
of individuals living near a site where a Chinese project will take place but is yet to be 
implemented at the time of the interview we control for unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics that may influence the selection of project sites. 
 First of all, the results consistently indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption. 
Moreover, the effect seemingly lingers after the project implementation period, and does not 
appear to be driven simply by an increase in economic activity, but rather seems to imply that the 
Chinese presence impacts local institutions.  
 Second, Chinese aid projects do indeed stand out from the projects of major Western donors 
in this respect. Running equivalent estimations for World Bank aid projects, for which there is 
also geo-referenced data available for a large multi-country African sample, we do not observe a 
corresponding increase in local corruption around project sites. In particular, whereas the results 
indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption but have no observable impact on local 
economic activity, they suggest that World Bank aid projects stimulate local economic activity 
without fuelling local corruption. Furthermore, suggestive evidence indicates that World Bank 
aid projects are successful in raising awareness of corruption. Comparing with other bilateral 
donors, who just as China might not have an equally explicit anti-corruption agenda as the World 
Bank, Chinese aid projects still stand out in terms of their estimated effects on local corruption. 
 To investigate whether the sectoral composition of aid is what drives the observed 
differences in local corruption, we compared Chinese and World Bank projects going to the same 
sectors. While the extent to which Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption seems to vary across 
sectors, the difference observed between the two donors remains when considering the transport 
sector alone, and hence is seemingly not the result of a disproportionate share of Chinese aid 
going to a sector particularly prone to corruption. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the results 
still provide no evidence of World Bank aid projects fueling local corruption. If anything, they 
actually indicate the opposite, that World Bank health projects tend to be located in areas with 
higher pre-existing corruption, but help reduce corruption once they are being implemented. This 
is interesting considering that the World Bank has been at the forefront of the ‘anti-corruption 
movement’ among major international organizations, with explicit anti-corruption policies as part 
of their agenda.  
 The results are in line with both economic incentive- and normative arguments on the impact 
of aid on local corruption. However, considering the lack of evidence for a relationship between 
Chinese aid and local economic activity as proxied by night time light and the suggestive 
evidence on the existence of norm transmission one could argue that it should at least not be 
dominated by the former. While China’s non-interference policy implies that they are unlikely to 
affect prescriptive norms in a direction delegitimizing corruption, their alleged use of corrupt 
practices in recipient countries risk affecting descriptive norms in a way that legitimizes 
corruption. Further research is needed on how the presence of donors can affect local institutions.  
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Table 1: Chinese aid and local corruption: Police bribes 


















       
active50 0.025*** 0.052***   0.048*** 0.082*** 
 (0.006) (0.009)   (0.008) (0.018) 
inactive50 -0.004 -0.010   -0.009 -0.021 
 (0.006) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.016) 
active25   0.062***    
   (0.011)    
inactive25   -0.005    
   (0.009)    
active75    0.043***   
    (0.008)   
inactive75    -0.006   
    (0.007)   
terminated50     0.026***  
     (0.006)  
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Region FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0284 0.0616 0.0666 0.0493 0.0573 0.103 
F test: active-inactive=0 12.74 40.79 30.73 35.01 6.363 29.11 
P-value of F-test 0.000360 1.83e-10 3.10e-08 3.46e-09 0.0117 7.10e-08 
Observations 67,431 63,596 59,904 67,919 89,969 63,596 
R-squared 0.077 0.094 0.095 0.091 0.096 0.096 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2: Chinese aid and local corruption: Permit bribes 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
active50 0.030*** 0.042***   0.033*** 0.060*** 
 (0.006) (0.009)   (0.008) (0.016) 
inactive50 0.021*** 0.002   0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.014) 
active25   0.044***    
   (0.011)    
inactive25   -0.001    
   (0.009)    
active75    0.032***   
    (0.008)   
inactive75    0.007   
    (0.007)   
terminated50     0.014**  
     (0.007)  
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Region FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.00956 0.0401 0.0456 0.0251 0.0309 0.0615 
F test: active-inactive=0 1.073 16.83 13.02 8.792 5.150 12.06 
P-value of F-test 0.300 4.14e-05 0.000311 0.00304 0.0233 0.000518 
Observations 67,545 63,684 60,001 68,002 90,050 63,684 
R-squared 0.060 0.077 0.078 0.075 0.080 0.078 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3: Other bribe outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES medical water school border 
     
active50 0.099*** 0.054*** 0.019 -0.116*** 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.013) (0.041) 
inactive50 0.046** 0.007 -0.008 -0.043 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.030) 
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.0532 0.0464 0.0264 -0.0731 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 3.921 2.791 3.223 2.558 
p value 0.0478 0.0949 0.0727 0.110 
 
Observations 34,027 34,859 44,048 8,822 
R-squared 0.121 0.094 0.082 0.088 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4: Nighttime light results for Chinese aid 
Panel A: Police bribes       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










       
active50 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.654**  0.069*** 0.079*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.285)  (0.012) (0.013) 
inactive50 -0.010 -0.012 0.751***  -0.013  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.230)  (0.008)  
median    0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
active_median      -0.002 
      (0.002) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0562 0.0818 -0.0966  0.0819  
F test: active-inactive=0 27.20 38.94 0.115  39.04  
p value of F-test 1.90e-07 4.76e-10 0.734  4.51e-10  
Observations 6,569 5,218 5,219 5,219 5,219 5,219 
R-squared 0.312 0.304 0.810 0.296 0.304 0.304 
 
Panel B: Permit bribes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
active50 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.654**  0.051*** 0.061*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.285)  (0.012) (0.012) 
inactive50 0.001 -0.007 0.751***  -0.008  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.230)  (0.009)  
median    0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
active_median      -0.002* 
      (0.001) 
Difference in difference 0.0372 0.0584 -0.0966  0.0585  
F test: active50-inactive50=0 11.81 20.18 0.115  20.27  
p value 0.000592 7.23e-06 0.734  6.90e-06  
Observations 6,570 5,219 5,219 5,220 5,220 5,220 
R-squared 0.282 0.261 0.810 0.257 0.261 0.261 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include 
the baseline controls, year fixed effects and region fixed effects.  
 
Table 5: Aid and corruption norms for Chinese and World Bank aid. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Media should  
report corruption 
Chinese aid 
Media should  
report corruption 
World Bank aid 
   
active50 0.006 0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) 
inactive50 0.053*** 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.025) 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive -0.0475 0.0402 
F test: active-inactive=0 5.425 3.334 
p value of F-test 0.0199 0.0679 
Observations 35,093 46,681 
R-squared 0.062 0.057 
 
 
Table 6: World Bank aid and local corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy Bribe permit dummy Bribe permit dummy 
     
Active50 -0.010 0.022* 0.007 0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Inactive50 0.006 0.010 0.018 0.027*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) 
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES NO YES NO 
Region FE NO YES NO YES 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive -0.0160 0.0116 -0.0116 0.00923 
F test: active-inactive=0 1.023 1.331 0.303 0.985 
p value 0.312 0.249 0.582 0.321 
Observations 81,569 76,986 81,639 77,034 
R-squared 0.078 0.090 0.062 0.074 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 Table 7: Nighttime light results for World Bank aid 
Panel A: Police bribes       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










       
active50 0.015 0.010 -0.578***  0.010 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.095)  (0.012) (0.012) 
inactive50 0.014 0.014 -0.883***  0.015  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.178)  (0.010)  
median    0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
active_median      0.002 
      (0.005) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.00156 -0.00417 0.304  -0.00428  
F test: active-inactive=0 0.0168 0.0834 4.422  0.0878  
p value of F-test 0.897 0.773 0.0355  0.767  
Observations 7,854 5,692 5,693 5,692 5,692 5,692 
R-squared 0.311 0.302 0.790 0.302 0.302 0.302 
 
Panel B: Permit bribes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
active50 0.026*** 0.029*** -0.578***  0.029*** 0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.095)  (0.011) (0.011) 
inactive50 0.020** 0.019** -0.883***  0.020**  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.178)  (0.009)  
median    0.000 0.001 0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
active_median      0.012** 
      (0.005) 
Difference in difference 0.00594 0.00971 0.304  0.00955  
F test: active50-inactive50=0 0.307 0.554 4.422  0.536  
p value 0.580 0.457 0.0355  0.464  
Observations 7,855 5,693 5,693 5,693 5,693 5,693 
R-squared 0.283 0.257 0.790 0.256 0.257 0.258 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include 




Table 8: Chinese and World Bank transport aid and local corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy Bribe permit dummy Bribe permit dummy 
     
Panel A: Chinese transport projects and local corruption 
active50 0.025** 0.065*** 0.025* 0.130*** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.027) 
inactive50 -0.023 -0.051*** 0.026 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0477 0.116 -0.000854 0.136 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 5.850 16.31 0.00126 15.68 
p-value of F test 0.0157 5.77e-05 0.972 7.98e-05 
Observations 26,356 12,648 26,467 12,708 
R-squared 0.064 0.051 0.043 0.035 
     
Panel B: World Bank transport projects and local corruption 
active50 0.002 -0.004 0.017 0.023* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
inactive50 0.018 0.026 0.042 0.040 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive -0.0158 -0.0298 -0.0255 -0.0169 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 0.846 1.601 1.533 0.362 
p-value of F test 0.358 0.206 0.216 0.547 
Observations 26,372 12,055 26,453 12,109 
R-squared 0.054 0.043 0.040 0.027 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include the baseline 
individual controls, year fixed effects and country fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 restrict the sample to include only recipient countries that have 
both Chinese and World Bank transport aid projects (Benin, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda). Columns 2 and 4 restrict 
the sample to include only recipient countries where respondents can be linked to both active and inactive Chinese and World Bank transport 
aid projects (Mali, Mozambique and Nigeria). 
 
 
Table 9: Health aid and local corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy Bribe permit dummy Bribe permit dummy 
 
Panel A: Chinese health projects and local corruption 
active50 0.001 0.004 0.017 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
inactive50 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive -0.0150 -0.0106 0.00357 -0.0212 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 1.114 0.336 0.0456 1.217 
p-value of F test 0.291 0.563 0.831 0.270 
Observations 22,281 14,466 22,272 14,451 
R-squared 0.088 0.079 0.056 0.071 
     
Panel B: World Bank health projects and local corruption 
active50 -0.001 -0.010 0.012 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
inactive50 0.012 0.005 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive -0.0125 -0.0149 -0.0172 -0.0232 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 1.199 1.072 2.219 2.944 
p-value of F test 0.274 0.301 0.137 0.0864 
Observations 29,466 20,036 29,451 20,017 
R-squared 0.084 0.067 0.055 0.056 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include the baseline 
individual controls, year fixed effects and country fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 restrict the sample to include only recipient countries that have 
both Chinese and World Bank health aid projects (Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Togo and 
Uganda). Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to include only recipient countries where respondents can be linked to both active and inactive 




Table 10: Comparison between Chinese and other bilateral aid project sites in Nigeria and Uganda 
 
Panel A: Chinese aid and local corruption in Nigeria and Uganda  
 Nigeria and Uganda Only Nigeria Only Uganda 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
active50 0.009 0.026 0.099** 0.117** -0.029 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.041) (0.046) (0.023) (0.031) 
inactive50 -0.024 -0.038 -0.031 -0.040 0.019 -0.006 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0334 0.0644 0.131 0.157 -0.0482 -0.00952 
F test: active-inactive=0 1.675 5.096 11.57 12.48 1.733 0.0723 
p-value of F-test 0.196 0.0242 0.000719 0.000447 0.189 0.788 
Observations 9,621 9,627 5,000 5,013 4,621 4,614 
R-squared 0.059 0.053 0.077 0.070 0.048 0.042 
 
Panel B: Other bilateral aid and local corruption in Nigeria and Uganda 
active50 0.016 0.049** 0.011 0.072*** 0.026 0.058** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.027) (0.052) (0.028) 
inactive50 -0.000 0.023 0.063 -0.011 0.013 0.050* 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.050) (0.040) (0.050) (0.027) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0159 0.0259 -0.0518 0.0829 0.0131 0.00798 
F test: active-inactive=0 0.895 3.057 0.876 3.284 0.462 0.236 
p value of F-test 0.344 0.0806 0.350 0.0706 0.497 0.627 
Observations 12,918 12,914 4,175 4,191 8,743 8,723 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.074 0.071 0.035 0.039 
Robust standard errors (clustered by survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include the baseline 






Table A1: Sectoral composition of our sample of Chinese aid projects 
Sector Freq. Percent Cum. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 9 3.96 3.96 
Communications 11 4.85 8.81 
Developmental Food Aid/Food Security .. 2 0.88 9.69 
Education 20 8.81 18.50 
Emergency Response 6 2.64 21.15 
Energy Generation and Supply 5 2.20 23.35 
Government and Civil Society 38 16.74 40.09 
Health 49 21.59 61.67 
Industry, Mining, Construction 1 0.44 62.11 
Other Multisector 4 1.76 63.88 
Other Social infrastructure and servi.. 20 8.81 72.69 
Population Policies / Programmes and .. 7 3.08 75.77 
Trade and Tourism 1 0.44 76.21 
Transport and Storage 42 18.50 94.71 
Water Supply and Sanitation 10 4.41 99.12 
Women in Development 2 0.88 100.00 









Table A2: Variable descriptions    
 
Dependent variables, experiences with corruption 
Police bribe dummy: Dummy variable equal to one if, during the past year, the respondent has ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or 
do a favour to government officials in order to ‘Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a 
fine or arrest)’; zero otherwise. 
Police bribe ordinal: ranging between 0 and 3, capturing the response categories ‘Never’, ‘Once or twice’, ‘A few times’, and 
‘Often’, respectively, given in response to the question if the respondent has ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a 
favour to government officials in order to ‘Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine 
or arrest)’ during the past year. 
Permit bribe dummy: Dummy variable equal to one if, during the past year, the respondent has ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, 
or do a favour to government officials in order to get a document or permit’; zero otherwise. 
Permit bribe ordinal: ranging between 0 and 3, capturing the response categories ‘Never’, ‘Once or twice’, ‘A few times’, and 
‘Often’, respectively, given in response to the question if the respondent has ‘had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a 
favour to government officials in order to get a document or permit’ during the past year. 
 
Proximity to Chinese project sites 
Active50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a site where a Chinese aid project is being 
implemented at the time of the interview, zero otherwise.  
Active25: Same as Active50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Active75: Same as Active50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Inactive50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a Chinese projects site where the 
implementation of the project had not yet started at the time of the interview and do not have any active or terminated 
project within this same distance, zero otherwise. 
Inactive25: Same as Inactive50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Inactive75: Same as Inactive50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
Terminated50: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives within 50 km of a terminated Chinese project and do not 
have any active project within this same distance, zero otherwise. 
Terminated25: Same as Terminated50 but using a 25 km cut-off. 
Terminated75: Same as Terminated50 but using a 75 km cut-off. 
 
Individual control variables 
Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise. 
Urban: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. 
Age variables: Age in years and age squared. 
Education (based on question about what the respondent’s highest level of education is):  
Primary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at primary school level (including 
those with incomplete primary); zero otherwise. Secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest 
level of education is at secondary school level (including those with incomplete secondary); zero otherwise. Post-
secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent’s highest level of education is at post-secondary school level 
(including those with incomplete post-secondary); zero otherwise. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has 
no formal schooling used as reference category in estimations. 
Employment: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has part-time or full-time paid employment, zero otherwise. 
Economic standing: dummy for reporting to often have gone without a cash income during the past year, zero otherwise. 
 
Year dummies: Dummies for interview year, 2002-2013 
Country dummies: Dummies for the 29 countries in the sample. 
Sub-national region dummies: Dummies for the 444 sub-national regions (first-order administrative division, indicated region or 





Table A3: Sample splits 
Panel A: Bribe police dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Richer Poorer Corrupt Less corrupt Democratic Less democ. 
       
active50 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.031*** 0.029 0.028*** 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) 
inactive50 0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.034** -0.002 -0.043** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.018) 
Diff-in-diff active-inactive 0.0276 0.0776 0.0368 0.0625 0.0294 0.0481 
F test: active-inactive=0 4.777 34.84 12.55 10.40 8.900 5.047 
p value of F-test 0.0289 4.23e-09 0.000402 0.00128 0.00287 0.0248 
Observations 33,058 28,097 32,753 28,402 39,021 22,134 
R-squared 0.100 0.087 0.052 0.088 0.088 0.073 
 
Panel B: Bribe permit dummy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Richer Poorer Corrupt Less corrupt Democratic Less democ. 
       
active50 0.057*** 0.025* 0.013 0.030* 0.032** 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) 
inactive50 0.011 0.003 0.002 -0.012 0.013* -0.052*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.018) 
Difference in difference 0.0461 0.0225 0.0111 0.0425 0.0187 0.0545 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 11.44 2.370 0.712 3.675 1.941 5.869 
p value 0.000726 0.124 0.399 0.0554 0.164 0.0155 
Observations 33,089 28,152 32,780 28,461 39,096 22,145 
R-squared 0.084 0.072 0.052 0.073 0.083 0.060 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All estimations include 
baseline controls, year fixed effects and region fixed effects.  
 
 
Table A4: Chinese aid and local corruption 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Police station Police officer 
   
Active50 -0.075*** -0.017 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
Inactive50 -0.012 -0.026 
 (0.026) (0.021) 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Difference in difference -0.0636 0.00828 
F perception1: active50-inactive50=0 3.004 0.126 
p value 0.0831 0.722 
Observations 63,242 63,964 
R-squared 0.247 0.247 





Table A5: Chinese aid and having no experience with the police or with applying for documents and permits.  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES No experience with police No experience with permit 
   
active50 0.045** 0.040** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
inactive50 -0.012 -0.028* 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
   
Observations 53,560 53,657 
R-squared 0.128 0.098 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.0577 0.0682 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 6.235 9.517 
p value 0.0126 0.00205 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A6: World Bank aid and local corruption 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Police station Police officer 
   
Active50 -0.022 -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.030) 
Inactive50 -0.071** -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.036) 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.0485 0.00408 
F perception1: active50-inactive50=0 2.320 0.0132 
p value 0.128 0.909 
Observations 76,478 77,375 
R-squared 0.254 0.239 
Robust standard errors (clustered by the geographical survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A7: World Bank aid and having no experience with the police or with applying for documents and permits.  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES No experience with police No experience with permit 
   
active50 0.016 0.030* 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
inactive50 0.014 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
   
Observations 66,279 66,345 
R-squared 0.110 0.092 
Baseline controls YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country FE NO NO 
Region FE YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.00123 0.0282 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 0.00407 1.976 
p value 0.949 0.160 





Table A8: Chinese aid and local corruption. Robustness tests. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy Bribe police dummy 
VARIABLES cluster region cluster country Less controls Extra controls 
     
active50 0.052** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
inactive50 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) 
     
Observations 63,596 63,596 66,307 62,969 
R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.081 0.098 
Baseline controls YES YES NO Extra 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Difference in difference 0.0616 0.0616 0.0659 0.0580 
F test: active50-inactive50=0 5.997 12.43 45.30 38.97 
p value 0.0148 0.00147 0 4.62e-10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the region level in column 1, at the country level in column 2 and at 
the Afrobarometer cluster level in columns 3 and four. Column 3 omits the baseline controls and column four contains controls for working, 
being without cash, and education (see the variable description in Table A1) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
